THE talks between the government and the opposition were doomed from the outset, even though the fact that the two sides sat face to face at the negotiating table was a positive sign. The meeting took place under the shadow of the PTI’s threatened long march to Islamabad, while the government brandished the option of governor’s rule in KP. The tension was palpable. The capital was sealed off with containers and the highways were blocked. Days before the talks, the military leadership warned against any repeat of a May 9-like situation — a clear message to the opposition not to cross the red line. Some opposition leaders, for their part, wanted a negotiated deal to bring down the political temperature. The prolonged discussions suggested a measure of seriousness on both sides, but mutual distrust and brinkmanship blocked any breakthrough. The two sides gave contrary accounts of why the talks collapsed after a marathon sitting. The government contended that the opposition backed out after agreeing to a final draft; the other side denied this, saying the differences were too wide to bridge. That so-called final draft is not in the public domain, but two major points of difference appear to have defeated the agreement. The PTI insisted on a meeting with Imran Khan, while the government wanted the KP provincial government to give unqualified support to the counterterrorism operation being carried out by the security forces. While conceding to the opposition’s demand that the former prime minister be allowed to meet his family and his lawyers, as ordered by the Islamabad High Court, and agreeing to implement the Supreme Court order to arrange his medical treatment, the government was not prepared to let PTI leaders meet and consult him before finalising the agreement — a condition it found unacceptable. The prevailing political instability has provided greater space to the militants. The real cause of the stalemate, however, was the issue of provincial government support, and taking ownership of a planned counterterrorism military operation in five southern districts, including the merged Fata regions. For the provincial government this was an extremely tricky matter: it had strongly opposed any kinetic operation involving the displacement of the population, and the bitter memories of earlier operations had created intense public opposition to any such action. A multiparty meeting called by the provincial government early this year — whose participants included provincial legislators belonging to PML-N, PPP and ANP — had unanimously opposed any large-scale military operation. Considering this, it was hard for the PTI to take ownership of a highly unpopular action. It may be true that the PTI has no clarity over how to combat the menace of terrorism that has swept a large part of the province. Its inaction, often seen as capitulation, has added to the problem. The ill-equipped police and Counter Terrorism Department have been a major target of militants, resulting in a virtual collapse of the administration in the troubled districts. That inaction could also be attributed to the ongoing confrontation between the PTI and the establishment-backed federal government. Then there is the question of whether we have a coherent, overarching national security policy and counterterrorism strategy to deal with this existential threat. There has rarely been any debate in parliament on internal security policy. It is all left to the security establishment, with hardly any policy input from the civilian leadership. KP has witnessed a strong resurgence of militancy over the last five years, which has claimed the lives of thousands of civilians and security personnel. Last year saw the highest number of terrorist attacks in the province since 2013, despite claims of successful intelligence operations that killed hundreds of terrorists. The prevailing political instability has provided greater space to the militants, who are now better equipped and better organised, and who have extended their activities to other parts of the province. Pakistan has blamed Afghanistan’s Taliban regime for providing sanctuaries and aiding the TTP, and each major terrorist attack is now answered by Pakistani strikes across the border. The closure of the border and of trade between the two countries over the past year has directly affected the local population and added to the tension between Peshawar and Islamabad. There is a serious disconnect in the policy the establishment pursues in dealing with terrorism, and the government needs to address those concerns. There are no two views about the imperatives of a national security policy, but there is also a need to bring all stakeholders on board for an overarching policy that should not rest entirely on kinetic operations. It is important to address the social and economic issues in order to win public support in the affected areas. The widening trust gap between the state and the people, and the politics of confrontation, are the biggest hurdles in combating terrorism. With little hope of the two sides returning to the negotiating table, the confrontation has now escalated: the PTI has begun its protest march from the southern KP districts. It is apparent that the PTI has changed its strategy of marching directly on Islamabad. Instead, the party now plans to mobilise its supporters in the province and camp close to the capital rather than march into the city. It is the first instance of a chief executive leading a protest that paralyses his own province. Meanwhile, the federal government is considering removing the PTI government and imposing a state of emergency or governor’s rule in the province. That would be an extremely dangerous move in a province already facing terrorist attacks, rising nationalism and tension on its border. Any such move by a state already fighting a separatist movement in Balochistan and a revolt-like situation in Azad Kashmir would be disastrous. The province is sitting on a powder keg, and the removal from power of an elected government that enjoys an overwhelming majority in the provincial assembly and broad popular support could ignite it in a way the state would struggle to extinguish. We never learn lessons from our own history, and make the same mistake again and again and expect different results. The writer is an author and journalist. [email protected] X: @hidhussain Published in Dawn, October 7th, 2026