WHILE the Balochistan insurgency has been simmering for many decades, in recent years, it seems to be spinning out of control. In July this year, Balochistan became the country’s most violent province, replacing KP for the first time. Some sources say there were 176 terrorist attacks, killing 438 people, including 127 security personnel, the highest ever in a month. This consistent increase in the insurgency’s lethality and spread implies a major mismatch between the threat and the measures taken to counter it. One major weakness is the imbalance between using armed force to address the challenge and subordinating the political dimension that sustains it. This begs the question: why do we continue to rely totally on the use of force to combat this insurgency, knowing that it has not worked for decades? Historically, COIN (counter-insurgency) strategies have succeeded only when they struck the right balance between armed force and political measures. At best, force can create the right conditions to end an insurgency, but only politics can use that opening to bring about peace through negotiations. In fact, David Galula, in his book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, argues that a successful COIN strategy is “80 per cent political and 20pc military”. His “First Law of COIN” is that “the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as the insurgent”, and that this support can be achieved only through political measures. Similarly, Rupert Smith, in his book The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, defines insurgency as “a war amongst people”. He points out the strategic error of using armed force in an insurgency in a way that alienates the local population, reducing the utility of the force used. Thus, local support is crucial to maximising the utility of armed force in dealing with an insurgency and giving the counter-insurgents the upper hand. Two broad narratives currently shape the Baloch insurgency. The first one, led by Baloch political leaders like Akhtar Mengal and Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (both heads of political parties and former chief ministers of Balochistan), emphasises that the insurgency in Balochistan is predominantly a political problem and requires a political approach for resolution. The second narrative — the military-led state view — which is being implemented in Balochistan is based on the premise that the Baloch insurgency is essentially sponsored by hostile foreign intelligence agencies, and local grievances are of secondary importance. At a workshop on Balochistan at GHQ last year, the military leadership pointed out that foreign-sponsored proxies continually sought to fuel violence and undermine stability in Balochistan. They would be met with a firm response by the military, it was said. This fundamental difference in the threat assessment of the Baloch insurgency between the establishment and the local political leadership leads to divergent responses. The externalisation of the insurgency in Balochistan explains the state’s predominant use of force. Framing the Baloch insurgency as being solely driven by Indian agencies makes it a part of the broader Pakistan-India hostility, and hence defines it as a security threat and not a political challenge. This narrative, naturally, supports a purely coercive response. Interestingly, as a response to the spike in violence in Balochistan in 2026, the state has responded by adding another command to FC Balochistan — with no concomitant political initiatives. Two broad narratives currently shape the Baloch insurgency. Indeed, there is much weight in the establishment’s assertion regarding external support to the Baloch insurgents, which is backed by solid evidence, such as the arrest of Indian agent Kulbhushan Jadhav. But to say that the insurgency is totally Indian-supported would be downplaying the significance of the local grievances, which sustain it. This makes our existing COIN strategy in Balochistan lopsided. Two factors strengthen the argument that the insurgency is grounded in local conditions. One, the triggers of the first four waves of Baloch insurgency were local — in 1948 (annexation of Kalat), 1958 (setting up of One Unit, which erased Balochistan as a political entity, and the arrest of Khan of Kalat), 1962-69 (continued One Unit centralisation, new cantonments in Marri/ Bugti areas and Ayub Khan’s repression), and 1973-77 (dismissal of the NAP government by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto). Second, the current insurgency wave has been going on for more than 20 years now, and to sustain it, a regular stream of local recruits, leadership, and support networks is needed. Such an elaborate network, working clandestinely, carrying out violent acts and hunted by the state, could not sustain itself without strong local support. That is not to say the state did not try to tap the political dimension. But the endeavour was sporadic, half-hearted, lacked political ownership, and was abandoned too soon. For instance, in 2015, the political and military leadership decided to launch Pur Aman Balochistan — a three-dimensional initiative comprising talks with militants under the leadership of the then chief minister, Dr Malik, some development projects, and an amnesty for certain categories of militants. Dr Malik contacted different leaders, such as Brahmdagh Bugti, and brought back their response. The talks were given up when Dr Malik’s tenure ended the same year. Other parts of this initiative also tapered off because the government showed little interest. Thus, the persistence of the use of force in Balochistan is primarily due to the framing of this insurgency as a proxy war of hostile countries, and not as an expression of local discontent. This threat assessment does not seem to be working. Carl von Clausewitz in On War states: “The most far-reaching act of judgement that any commander has to make is to establish … the kind of war on which they are embarking.” Because we cannot control it with our current strategy, we must review our assessment of the kind of “war amongst people” we are fighting in Balochistan. Is it an exclusively foreign proxy war or the violent response of radicalised, disgruntled elements of Balochistan, exploited by hostile external elements? Today’s answer will determine whether we can resolve the situation or whether it will become a ‘forever insurgency’. The writer is a former police officer who was Nacta’s first national coordinator. Published in Dawn, October 16th, 2026