THE civil-military relationship in Pakistan has never been ideal. Despite recent conciliatory efforts and the policy of accommodation adopted by the coalition government, concerns within security-focused circles persist about the handling of several government affairs. For now, though, there is little chance of an escalation in civil-military tensions involving the federal and provincial governments; the last hitch was the PTI government, which was ousted through governor’s rule and emergency. The major allegation against the PTI government has been that it was hesitant to take a clear position against the terrorists, enabling them to expand their influence in parts of the province, especially in the southern districts. The establishment is sensitive about the narrative, and considers it subversion and part of hybrid warfare; it looks upon any political or ideological support for it as support to the enemy. Terminology describing Taliban-aligned terrorists as ‘Fitna al-Khwarij’ and Baloch insurgents as ‘Fitna al-Hindustan’ reflects the same approach. Everyone is expected to follow this approach; the PTI government’s disagreement on several security-related policies is, therefore, interpreted as an act of subversion. Meanwhile, it is clear how much civilian governments actually contribute to security-related affairs. The security domain has often caused friction between the establishment and civilian governments; over the decades, the political leadership has learned not to voice disagreement on security-related affairs. ‘Memogate’ was the last such lesson for the PPP; and ‘Dawn leaks’ for Mian Nawaz Sharif; the removal of Imran Khan’s PTI from its provincial seat of power in KP appears to have followed the same pattern. The story is not simply about subversion or disagreement over security policy. There are other relevant aspects that some commentators have pointed out: among them is the fiscal issue which also triggered the call for new provinces and the reversal of the 18th Amendment. Yet another dimension is linked to closing the Afghan file. Bhutto’s policy was just the lever. It was Zia who turned it into an ideology. The Afghan policy has shaped Pakistan’s politics for half a century; but now there is a general acceptance, even within security circles, that it has not worked. It is evident that the state is distancing itself from past approaches. In this regard, some intellectuals and commentators have painted militancy as a cultural expression of Pakhtuns, which the local dynamics of the larger Pakhtun society has aggravated. There is no need to deconstruct such a perception, which would be stigmatisation. In effect, applying a sociocultural lens to the issue takes away focus from the main architects of the security and Afghan policy. The previous Afghan policy worked well but had lost its utility in geopolitical contexts. This was the policy crafted by the military dictator Gen Ziaul Haq and his team, and it was more or less functional until the Taliban captured power in Afghanistan in August 2021. Though the Zia file saw a few changes and amendments, the overall framework for dealing with these affairs did not change much. The Zia file had a few critical components that even allies including Washington, Beijing, Riyadh, and Ankara had concerns about — particularly the reliance on non-state actors. Mian Nawaz Sharif had drawn attention to it but faced the consequences. Many analysts believe that this flawed policy was responsible for spawning the TTP and generating terrorism in KP but official narratives do not link the state of affairs to the policy choices made earlier. Establishment circles appear to want a new Afghan policy that best suits their geopolitical and internal security objectives. A complete detachment from the Taliban is part of the new approach, and the Sohail Afridi government was reluctant to adopt it because it would mean a large-scale military operation, displacement, and increased security-related resource allocation — which would also have political consequences. After the removal of his government, the hurdles preventing a new policy have been eliminated; the new set-up now has to deliver, as was expected of the Afridi government. There will be no opportunity any longer to shift the onus of blame onto a political government, despite official narratives distancing the security state from political change in KP. However, the dimensions of the new Afghan policy remain unclear. For instance, how will the state proceed if the Afghan Taliban agree to detach themselves from the terrorist networks operating against Pakistan from Afghan soil? Still, another argument being promoted is that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, not Gen Ziaul Haq, was the real architect of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. There is some truth to that. After Sardar Daud’s 1973 coup in Kabul and his revival of the Pakhtunistan issue, the Bhutto government began hosting and training Afghan Islamists, among them men who would later become the commanders of the anti-Soviet jihad. The FC and a small circle of officials ran this as a pressure tool against Kabul. Notably, the province’s first governor after 1973, appointed in 1975, following the ban on the National Awami Party, reflected the same anxieties about Pakhtun nationalism and Afghanistan. But Bhutto’s policy was just the lever. It was Zia who turned it into an ideology. After the Soviet invasion of 1979, the Afghan question became the organising principle of the state: the jihad, the refugee economy, the madressah network, the doctrine of strategic depth, and an intelligence apparatus that grew more powerful than the elected institutions meant to oversee it. That legacy matters, and it is Zia’s. Now it is up to the supporters of the PPP how they take the argument, and whether they are ready to carry the entire burden of history on their shoulders; they also face criticism that Benazir Bhutto continued Bhutto’s legacy and allowed Gen Naseerullah Babar to nurture the Taliban in 1994-96, the same general who had crafted the Afghan files for her father. The Taliban generations have caused huge losses to the PPP, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto herself. The writer is a security analyst. Published in Dawn, October 18th, 2026